Avoiding the Expropriation Nightmare- Tax Consequences and Asset Protection Techniques by Barrett, Richard W.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 3 Article 6 
4-1-1998 
Avoiding the Expropriation Nightmare- Tax Consequences and 
Asset Protection Techniques 
Richard W. Barrett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard W. Barrett, Avoiding the Expropriation Nightmare- Tax Consequences and Asset Protection 
Techniques, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 831 (1998) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol52/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Avoiding the Expropriation Nightmare-
Tax Consequences and Asset
Protection Techniques
RICHARD W. BARRETT*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 832
A . The Problem .................................................... 833
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE ........................................... 835
A. Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine .............................. 836
1. THE RECOGNITION DOCTRINE .................................... 836
2. THE BERNSTEIN EXCEPTION ....................................... 836
3. THE HISTORY OF THE HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT .................. 837
a. The Hickenlooper Amendment .............................. 839
b. Criticism of the Hickenlooper Amendment .................... 840
c. The Gonzalez Amendment ................................. 840
4. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT ......................... 841
Ill. EXPROPRIATION ...................................................... 842
A. The Expropriation Test ........................................... 842
1. A CASE HISTORY OF THE EXPROPRIATION PROCESS .................. 843
2. UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE .................................. 843
a. Tangible Property ......................................... 843
b. Bank Accounts ........................................... 844
c. Loss of Business Entity .................................... 845
3. INTENTIONAL CONDUCT BY THE EXPROPRIATING GOVERNMENT ........ 846
4. EXPROPRIATION BY A DE JURE OR DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ........... 847
5. FIXING THE DATE OF AN EXPROPRIATION FOR VALUATION PURPOSES ... 847
B. Compensation Standards .......................................... 847
1. REM EDIES ... ................................................... 848
2. THE METHODOLOGY OF DAMAGE CALCULATIONS .................... 848
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES ... ................................................. 849
A. The Tax Consequences of an Expropriation .......................... 849
1. CODE SECTION 165 ............................................ 849
2. CODE SECTION 166 ............................................ 851
V. ASSET PROTECTION TECHNIQUES .......................................... 852
A . Risk Analysis .................................................... 852
B. Long-Term Planning Against Expropriation .......................... 852
C. Short-Term Planning Against Expropriation .......................... 853
D. Crisis Planning While the Expropriation Is in Progress ................ 853
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 854
* LL.M., Taxation, University of Miami School of Law; J.D., California Western School of
Law. Mr. Barrett is an associate in the Dallas office of Bickel & Brewer, where he specializes in
commercial litigation, bankruptcy litigation, and tax controversies. The views expressed herein
are those of the author, and not Bickel & Brewer.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have seen the Berlin Wall collapse, the once
mighty Soviet Union disintegrate into a fragment of its former self, and
South Africa begin a new era without apartheid. For the first time in
decades, the world seems safe.
Problems, however, still exist. The Bosnia-Hercegovina conflict,
China and Taiwan, Saddam Hussein and Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Iran, Colo-
nel Muammar al-Qadhafi and Libya, and North Korea and South Korea,
to name a few. Despite these isolated conflicts, an expropriation should
be a thing of the past; however, it is not.
In 1995, U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) proposed Amendment 448 to House
Bill 1158, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which dis-
cussed the Senate's concern that taxpayers should not be able to avoid
taxes by renouncing their U.S. citizenship.1 What is noteworthy is the
Forbes article that was read into the record by Senator Kennedy,
explaining the threat of expropriation:
Offshore money is growing faster than any other part of the financial
services industry. It's multiplying at a double-digit rate of growth.
Wealthy Europeans, Latin Americans, Asians and Middle Eas-
terners are Merrill [Lynch's] principal clients here. They want to
buffer their fortunes against expropriation, political unrest, [and]
economic instability.
Today, many wealthy Kuwaitis have trusts offshore to protect
their fortunes from Saddam Hussein . ... '
Therefore, the threat of expropriation still exists.3
With the possibility of an expropriation, multinational investors
should conduct their "due diligence" before investing in a foreign juris-
diction. Accordingly, this Article will provide an overview of the expro-
1. See Kennedy Amendment on Expatriate Tax Loophole Passes 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 78-12
(Aug. 24, 1995). This Amendment was incorporated into the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 and signed into law by President Clinton in August 1996. See H.R.
3103, 104th Cong. (1996).
2. Id. See also Robert Lenzner & Philippe Mao, The New Refugees, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994,
at 131, 134 (emphasis added).
3. See Partial Text: Western Samoa 'International Companies Act 1987 (Incorporating
Amendments to March 1996),' Pt. X, 96 TAX NOTES INT'L 164-30 (Aug. 22, 1996). It provides
for the incorporation of international companies and registration of foreign companies that want a
permanent establishment in Western Samoa. Note that section 228B defines "expropriation" as
"any act of confiscation, compulsory acquisition, nationalization or any similar act ... where any
foreign government expropriates any membership interest of a member of an international
company . I..." d  Clearly, expropriation is not a dinosaur of the past.
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priation nightmare, the Act of State Doctrine, sanctions against an
expropriation, asset protection techniques to minimize an expropriation,
and the tax consequences of an expropriation. Although the expropria-
tion scene has been silent for some time, one thing is certain-history
repeats itself.
A. The Problem
Expropriation occurs when a foreign country seizes on investment
through direct governmental interference, such as by military takeover,
by mandated national ownership of all or partial particular ventures, or
by indirect means. Indirect means may include creeping or constructive
interferences, such as the imposition of currency restrictions, the enact-
ment of income or estate taxes,4 and the taking of property,5 or corporate
or trust assets of U.S. nationals without prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation.6
For example, ABC corporation ("ABC"), a U.S. corporation, oper-
ates a clothes manufacturing facility in country X. When ABC opened
its facility in country X, the government was stable. Country X, however,
is now embroiled in the midst of civil strife and its economic structure is
fragile. The government regime begins to heed the call for nationaliza-
4. See Robert C. Lawrence III, International Tax & Estate Planning: A Practical Guide for
Multinational Investors § 5, at 5-1, 5-2 (3d ed. 1996). Lawrence describes these "extraordinary
events" as including "direct governmental interferences, such as military takeovers, expropriation
or mandated national ownership of all or part of particular ventures; and indirect, creeping, or
constructive interferences, such as the imposition of currency restrictions or the enactment of
onerous income or estates taxes." Id. at 5-1.
5. See id. at 5-8 (stating that "'property' includes real or personal tangible property,
intangible property and any interest in such property. Assets of a corporation or a trust clearly fall
within this definition.") (footnotes omitted). For a more thorough discussion of the treatment of
corporate assets in the international context, see generally Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15 (1917); S.
FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-11 (1953); Frank G. Dawson & Burns H.
Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective:" A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30
FORDHAM L. REv. 727 (1962); George Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of
Nationalized Russian Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 1130 (1930); Allan R. Tessler, Note,
International Law, Conflict of Laws: The Act of State Doctrine, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1962).
6. See Monroe Leigh, Expropriation of Foreign Owned Investment-Recent Trends, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 197, 198-224 (1972); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the
Hickenlooper Amendment, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 120 (1988). Lawrence defines the term
expropriation to refer to the:
taking of property other than for a proper, recognized public purpose or under
circumstances where the owner is not provided with prompt, adequate or effective
compensation .... [T]he acts constituting . . . 'expropriation' are taken pursuant to
the sovereign's exercise of rights analogous to those connoted by the Anglo-
American concept of 'eminent domain.'
Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-2.
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tion,7 and subsequently takes over the operations of ABC, either
expressly or implicitly.8 What was once a U.S. corporation operating in
country X, is now being operated by government X-the expropriation
has occurred.9 Consequently, government X now runs the operations of
ABC, senior management of ABC are replaced by hand-selected execu-
tives of country X, and the former U.S. corporation operating in country
X ceases to have connections with its U.S. parent.
For ABC, the expropriation is a sobering event. First, the costs
associated with developing the physical plant will be lost since there is
no "return of' its capital investment.'I The lost investment capital can
be substantial, depending on the type of industry. In some cases, expro-
priations have exceeded fifty million dollars. 1' Moreover, initial capital
investments were probably from borrowed funds and the expropriation
caused the loans to be declared in default (assuming the U.S. corporation
was unable or unwilling to meet its debt obligations). In essence, the
expropriation could trigger a domino effect on the U.S. corporation and
damage its credit rating.'
2
Second, U.S. workers in country X will probably become unem-
ployed due to the expropriation. 3 Typically, the foreign country that
7. "Nationalization," generally means to change from private to governmental control.
Lawrence defines an act of nationalization to represent:
[A] sovereign's exercise of rights analogous to those connoted by the Anglo-
American concept of 'eminent domain' . . . [which] purport[s] to justify a
sovereign's presumably 'inherent' right to take, or to authorize the taking of, private
property for public use without the owner's consent, under which private rights are
subordinated to the governments.
Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-2 to 5-3.
8. The term "expressly" refers to a written proclamation by the foreign government that an
expropriation has occurred; the term "implicitly" refers not to written authority, but to the
replacement of existing management with handpicked management by the foreign government.
9. See Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and
Compensation: A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21
INT'L LAW. 639, 643 (1987).
Lawrence defines expropriation as the:
taking of property other than for a proper, recognized public purpose or under
circumstances where the owner is not provided with prompt, adequate, or effective
compensation . . . . [T]he most recent American example of such interference
occurred in January 1986, after allegations surfaced of State sponsorship of
international terrorism by the Libyan government. The United States responded
with a trade embargo and also "froze" Libyan assets within the United States or
within the possession or control of United States "persons."
Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-2 & n.2. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 414 reporter's note 9 (1987) (discussing sanctions against
Libya); Leigh, supra note 6, at 211-18 (ex
10. See discussion infra Part IV, regarding tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.
11. See infra note 41.
12. See Brower, supra note 9, at 645-52.
13. See id.
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caused the expropriation will replace key employees with hand-selected
locals.1 4 Additionally, displacement costs associated with an expropria-
tion are costly to the corporation.15 Once the expropriation has
occurred, concern for the U.S. employees becomes a major issue, since
the expropriation often occurs in the midst of civil strife.16 Once
employees are located and safety is provided, then safe passage back to
the United States becomes paramount.' 7
Finally, after the expropriation, ABC will face the problem of
whether Country X will provide prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation for the expropriation.18 Admitting that an expropriation has
occurred is one thing, but obtaining adequate compensation is another.' 9
Some countries will admit to an expropriation, yet avoid any form of
compensation. Furthermore, negotiated settlements usually take years,
and generally, the final compensation does not equal the book value of
the loss suffered by the U.S. corporation.
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The Act of State Doctrine ("State Doctrine") generally prohibits an
American court from adjudicating the validity of a foreign act commit-
ted by a foreign nation within its own territory, 20 unless the act commit-
ted falls within an exception to the doctrine.2' The purpose of the State
14. See id. at 642-43.
15. Costs borne by the U.S. corporation resulting from the expropriation may include costs
for relocating personnel, moving family belongings, and providing safety of passage back to the
United States.
16. See Brower, supra note 9, at 640-43.
17. See id. A foreign country may prohibit former employees from leaving and could also put
former employees under "house arrest".
18. See infra Section III.
19. See infra text accompanying note 46. IT&T had an expropriation loss valued between $6
million to $8 million, yet only $400,000 in compensation was granted to IT&T.
20. The Act prevents U.S. courts from evaluating the merits of a foreign expropriation of
property of U.S. nationals, no matter how arbitrary or despotic the law authorizing the
confiscation may be. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1964).
Lawrence explains that:
[the] act of state doctrine, which in its simplest form, is the principle that the courts
of one sovereign will not examine the validity of public acts committed by another
recognized sovereign within its own territory. An act of state is a public act
committed within the sovereign's territorial limits by the government or by a person
whose authority derives from the government.
Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-46.
21. The Act does not apply under the following circumstances: (1) if the United States is at
war with a foreign nation or does not recognize it; (2) if suit is filed to enforce a foreign nation's
criminal laws; (3) if the act was not performed within foreign nations' territory; (4) if a treaty
covers the controversy; and (5) if a "clear" violation of international law occurred. See Jack E.
Sands, Comment, International Law-Act of State Doctrine: First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), 49 WASH. L. REV. 213, 223-24 (1973).
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Doctrine is two-fold: (1) it allows the President of the United States to
conduct foreign policy without judicial interference;2 2 and (2) it prohib-
its imposition of Western idealogies on non-Western nations. 23  The
State Doctrine is determined exclusively by federal law.24
The State Doctrine has been applied to determine the deductibility
of foreign expropriation losses of personal assets pursuant to section
165(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, while the policy of the doctrine
precludes characterizing an expropriation act as a theft, resulting in
nondeductibility. 5
A. Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
There are several exceptions to the State Doctrine. These include
the Recognition Doctrine, the Bernstein Exception, the Hickenlooper
Amendment, Second Circuit decisions, and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.2 6
1. THE RECOGNITION DOCTRINE
Under the Recognition Doctrine, when the forum sovereign does
not recognize the foreign government as the true (i.e., de jure) govern-
ment, then the courts of that foreign sovereign are not bound by the State
Doctrine. 7 In the United States, the executive branch, through the State
Department, is the appropriate authority to extend recognition to a for-
eign government.28
2. THE BERNSTEIN EXCEPTION
Under the Bernstein Exception, the State Doctrine is inapplicable if
the executive branch does not object to a lower court's examination of a
foreign sovereign's actions.29 This policy was first discussed in First
National City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba,3° wherein the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "where the Executive Branch, charged as it is
22. See Sabatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 424-25 (stating that "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships
with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law.") (footnote omitted).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-62 to 5-83.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 205 (1987).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 204.
29. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-65.
30. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-65 to 5-67.
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with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine would
not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine
should not be applied by the courts."31
Subsequent case law has further established this exception to the
State Doctrine, thereby permitting the courts to hear disputes regarding
the validity of a foreign sovereign's actions.32 It should be noted that
the executive branch or State Department should issue a "Bernstein Let-
ter" to the court indicating no objection to a U.S. court's jurisdiction.33
3. THE HISTORY OF THE HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT
Under the Hickenlooper Amendment, U.S. courts, whether state or
federal, cannot use the State Doctrine as a basis for declining to hear a
case. 34 The Hickenlooper Amendment, however, is not applicable in
several circumstances: when the act of state does not violate interna-
tional law;3 5 when the matter involves contract claims; 36 and when the
executive branch determines that foreign policy concerns preempt the
application of the State Doctrine.37
Historically, the Hickenlooper Amendment, "broadly stated,
requires the President to suspend foreign assistance to any country
which expropriates the investment of U.S. nationals without paying
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. '38  The Hickenlooper
Amendment was the result of previous attempts to deal with expropria-
tion of U.S. property abroad. Prior to the Hickenlooper Amendment,
31. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768.
32. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-65 to 5-67 & nn.275-287 therein.
33. See id. at 5-66 to 5-67, 5-74; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658
F.2d 875, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). The court stated that:
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bernstein letter advising the courts
that it believes [the] act of state doctrine need not be applied, (2) there is no showing
that an adjudication of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and
(3) the claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of counterclaim and
does not exceed the value of the sovereign's claim, adjudication of the counterclaim
for expropriation of the defendant's property is not barred by the act of state
doctrine.
Id. at 884 (footnote omitted).
34. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-67 to 5-68 & n.288 therein.
35. See id. at 5-68 & n.291 (citing Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021
(5th Cir. 1972)).
36. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-68 & n.292 (citing Occidental of UMM Al Qaywayn,
Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975); French v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 242 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1968).
37. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-68 & n.293 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243
F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
38. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 115.
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U.S. policy over the past 150 years has been to protect investments of
U.S. businesses in foreign countries. The mechanism for protection
focused on four fronts: (1) diplomatic, (2) military, (3) legal, and (4)
economic remedies.39 The common theme among the remedies was that
each required some form of intervention by the U.S. government."n
The U.S. foreign policy response to expropriation changed in 1959,
when Fidel Castro gained power in Cuba and immediately expropriated
approximately one billion dollars in U.S. property.41 In a proactive mea-
sure to prevent further expropriations, Congress added a new subsection
503(b) to the Mutual Security Act of 1954,42 which required the Presi-
dent to suspend assistance under the State Doctrine to any nation which
expropriated property owned by U.S. persons and that had not dis-
charged its obligation under international law within six months of the
expropriation. 43 This remedy required the U.S. government to intervene
in order to be effective. Adopting this provision to the Mutual Security
Act of 1954 was the pivotal point for "legislatively mandated govern-
ment involvement in investment disputes" which still continues today.44
39. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 116.
40. See id. at 125.
41. See id.; see also Micheline Maynard U.S., Canada Face Off Over Cuba Policy, USA
TODAY, July 15, 1996, at 3B (identifying some of the U.S. companies that are seeking settlements
from Cuba regarding that government's expropriation of their businesses over three decades ago).
According to this article, "[d]ozens of U.S. companies filed claims against Cuba more than three
decades ago after Fidel Castro's government confiscated their property." Id. The following is a
list of some of the claims that have been certified by the U.S. government. The amounts reflect
the original claims. The companies are entitled to 6% annual interest on their claims, from the day
the claim arose (which would be from 1959 to the early 1960s) to the date of settlement with the
Cuban government. The certified claims (in millions) are as follows: American Brands $10.6,
Amstar $81.0, Boise Cascade $11.7, Coca-Cola $27.5, Colgate-Palmolive $14.4, Continental Can
$8.9, DuPont $3.0, Firestone Tire & Rubber $1.1, Ford Motor $0.2, General Dynamics $10.4,
General Electric $5.4, General Motors $3.8, Goodrich, B.F. $2.2, Goodyear Tire & Rubber $5.1,
Hilton International $1.9, IBM World Trade $6.4, IT&T $47.6, International Paper $1.1, King
Ranch $1.7, Navistar $8.3, Lone Star Cement $24.9, Moa Bay Mining $88.3, Owens Illinois $5.1,
Pepsi-Cola Metro Bottling $1.6, PepsiCo $0.2, Procter & Gamble $5.0, Reynolds Metals $3.4,
Sears $3.7, Sherwin Williams $2.2, Bristol-Meyers Squibb $1.5, Standard Brands $1.4, Standard
Oil $71.6, Sterling Drug $1.3, Swift & Co. $5.5, Texaco $50.1, Texaco (Latin America) $5.1, U.S.
Rubber $9.5, Warner-Lambert $1.6, Wilson International $0.2, and Woolworth $9.2. See id. The
total is $543.7 million. At 6% annual interest compounding from 1959 through 1996, the amount
is $5.3 billion.
42. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 125 & n.59, (noting that this addition is found in the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, 68 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 1755 (1959)), repealed by Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 642(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75
Stat. 424, 460 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151), and that it provided assistance to foreign nations to
assure self government and freedom from domination by other nations).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 126-27.
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a. The Hickenlooper Amendment
Following the expropriation of U.S. property by the government of
Cuba, the government of Brazil, on February 16, 1962, issued a decree
expropriating property belonging to a subsidiary of IT&T.45 Although
IT&T lost between six million to eight million dollars, only $400,000 in
compensation was granted to IT&T for the expropriation.46
As a result, corporate-America campaigned to terminate foreign
assistance to foreign countries engaging in uncompensated expropria-
tion. Major participating corporations included Standard Oil (N.J.),
United Fruit, Texaco, IT&T, the American Petroleum Institute, the
National Foreign Trade Council, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.47
Concurrently, U.S. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, who was
the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
added an "amendment requiring the President to suspend assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act to any State which expropriated the
property of a U.S. national unless within six months it took steps deter-
mined by the President to be 'appropriate' to discharge its responsibility
for compensation under international law."48 The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment was signed into law on August 1, 1962,49 and like the Mutual
Security Act, intended to stop future expropriations. However, it denied
the President the power to waive its provisions, thereby creating a
stricter remedy than the Mutual Security Act, which authorized presi-
dential waivers.50
In 1963, the Hickenlooper Amendment was further expanded to
extend expropriation status when contracts were repudiated or nulli-
fied.5 Additionally, the Hickenlooper Amendment now applied to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,52 and to any other acts having the effect
of an expropriation of property.53 Furthermore, value determinations
and advisory reports were to be made to the President within ninety
days.54 Finally, the revised amendment required that "speedy compen-
45. See id. at 127 n.67.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 127 (citing Juan de Onis, Brazilians Seize U.S. Phone System, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
17, 1962, at Al).
48. Id. at 128.
49. Id. at 129. Senator Hickenlooper commented, with respect to recent expropriations, that
"[i]f we do not do something to stop that kind of nonsense, or see that payment is made for
property when it is seized, we shall see a wave of expropriation of property of Americans going
throughout the world like a prairie fire." 108 CONG. REC. 9940 (1962).
50. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 129.
51. See id. at 131-32.
52. See id. at 132.
53. See id.
54. See id.; see also 109 CONG. REc. 20,215 (1963).
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sation for such property [be] in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent
to the full value thereof."55 In effect, this "modification precluded any
argument that equitable compensation was less than full value."56
b. Criticism of the Hickenlooper Amendment
The major criticism of the Hickenlooper Amendment is that it
favors private industry and wealth over the public interest of the United
States.57 Essentially, private wealth of corporations is given greater pri-
ority over the national interest of the United States. For example, a ren-
egade official of a foreign country could expropriate property owned by
U.S. nationals, knowing that his government will not pay compensation,
resulting in strained foreign policy between the two countries due to the
potential enforcement of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Even though
the Hickenlooper Amendment can be waived, it probably will be politi-
cally difficult for the President to do SO.5 8 Moreover, even if the Presi-
dent exercises the waiver, there is no guarantee that it will reduce the
foreign policy conflict.
59
The political problem with the Hickenlooper Amendment is that it
requires the United States to become embroiled in a dispute between a
U.S. investor and a foreign country. Therefore, in light of this problem,
some commentators argue that the cost of doing business in a foreign
country requires U.S. investors to follow caveat emptor principles.6"
c. The Gonzalez Amendment
From 1963 to 1971, the Hickenlooper Amendment was the primary
sanction against expropriation. During this period, Congress and the
business community essentially felt that no additional legislation would
be needed to deal with expropriation due to the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment. Yet by 1971, the amendment was insufficient for the expropria-
tions that were occurring in Latin America.61
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 157 (citing Richard B. Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 423-27 (1963)).
58. See id. at 159.
59. See id. at 159-60.
60. "Caveat Emptor" is Latin for "let the buyer beware." Senator Dodd, in testimony
regarding Senator Jesse Helms' amendment to terminate assistance to Costa Rica unless a
settlement was reached regarding an expropriation matter, correctly observed that "it seems ... we
are turning the U.S. Senate into a small claims court." 134 CoNG. REC. S8993-9003 (daily ed.
July 7, 1988); see also Matthew H. Adler, Congressional Involvement in Expropriation Cases: A
Case Study of the "Factfinding Process," 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 211, 235 (1989).
61. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 134-35; see generally John E. Huerta, Peruvian
Nationalization and the Peruvian-American Compensation Agreements, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
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In 1971, Congress was asked to authorize additional funds for the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and
the International Development Association.62 During Congressional
debate, "complaints [were made] about the Administration's unwilling-
ness to suspend assistance to Chile or Peru under the Hickenlooper
Amendment."63 Congressman Henry Gonzalez of Texas, during mark-
up by the House Banking and Currency Committee, added an amend-
ment to the three bills which would limit financial assistance to coun-
tries not cooperating with the United States in providing adequate
compensation for an expropriation:
[The bill] required the Secretary of the Treasury64 to instruct the U.S.
Executive Directors of the World Bank, the Assistant Development
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank to vote against any
loan or other utilization of bank funds for the benefit of a country
which repudiated a contract with or expropriated the property of a
U.S. national unless the President determined that (1) an arrangement
for prompt, adequate and effective compensation had been made; (2)
the parties had submitted the dispute to arbitration under the rules of
the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes; or (3) good faith negotiations were in progress aimed at pro-
viding prompt, adequate and effective compensation.65
Similar to the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Gonzalez Amendment did
not have a Presidential-waiver provision.66 It was also harsher than the
Hickenlooper Amendment. First, the expropriating states had to take
specified action, in contrast with the appropriate steps contained in the
Hickenlooper Amendment. Second, the Gonzalez Amendment did not
allow expropriating states a reasonable time to take specific action,
unlike the Hickenlooper Amendment.67 The bills became law, effective
on March 10, 1972.68
4. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Another exception to the Act of State Doctrine is the Foreign Sov-
POL. 1 (1977) (describing Peruvian expropriation of U.S. property between 1968 and 1973, and
subsequent settlement of resulting claims).
62. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 136.
63. Id. at 136 (footnote omitted).
64. The reference to the Secretary of the Treasury was replaced by a reference to the
President. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. REP. No. 770,
at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2002, 2009-10.
65. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 136 (citation omitted).
66. See id. Congress later granted the President the power to waive enforcement of the
Hickenlooper Amendment in 1973. See id. at 140 & nn.139, 141-42 (citing 119 CONC. REC.
32,240, 38,014 (1973)).
67. See id. at 136-37.
68. See id. at 137.
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ereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), passed by Congress in 1976.69 Under
FSIA, four public policy concerns were incorporated: (1) a policy to
restrict the sovereign immunity doctrine; (2) a policy to authorize the
judiciary, not the executive branch, to determine when sovereign immu-
nity should be granted to a foreign sovereign; (3) a policy to eliminate in
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, and to grant in personam jurisdiction
in all suits against foreign states, provided such actions are within FSIA;
and (4) a policy to eliminate punitive damages against foreign
sovereigns.7 °
Under FSIA, there is a long-arm statute feature similar to the one
enacted in the District of Columbia, but it does not have the scope of a
traditional state long-arm statute. 7 Like the traditional long-arm statute,
the constitutional minimum contacts to obtain jurisdiction are required. 72
Once the foreign sovereign comes within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts, the sovereign is treated like a domestic sovereign.
73
III. EXPROPRIATION
A. The Expropriation Test
As previously explained, expropriation occurs when a foreign
country takes the investment of U.S. nationals without prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation.74 Historically, this policy was developed
during "the 1930's [when] Secretary of State Cordell Hull enunciated in
a diplomatic note to Mexico the formulation that has become the corner-
stone of the U.S. government's modern expropriation policy: expropria-
tion is unlawful under customary international law unless accompanied
by 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation. ' 75 Mexico disputed
the U.S. policy, but it was supported by European States.
76
The first prong of the expropriation test deals with the term
"prompt," which requires that "payment be made before or at the time of
expropriation and that payment occur upon expeditious completion of
69. See Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-75 to 5-76.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1487 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-76.
71. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-76 & n.320 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(e) (West 1996));
Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th
Cir. 1980)).
72. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 5-76 & n.321 (citing Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978)).
73. See id. at 5-76.
74. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 5-76.
75. Id. (footnote omitted).
76. Id. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (3d ed.
1979).
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formalities."77 The second prong deals with "adequate" compensation,
which has been defined as the fair market value of the property at the
date of expropriation.78 The final prong is "effective" compensation,
which requires payment be made in a "freely convertible currency to
allow the investor to repatriate the payment."79 Determining whether an
expropriation has occurred is not easily accomplished. In addition to the
three-prong test, a company must allege that the foreign country is liable
for the conduct, and, if so, it must determine the date of expropriation. 80
1. A CASE HISTORY OF THE EXPROPRIATION PROCESS
In the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ("Tribunal"),8 which
was implemented to resolve disputes regarding the "expropriations or
other measures affecting property rights,"82 it became apparent that
many cases before the Tribunal involved a "gray area of expropriation in
which no formal taking is announced by the host government, but the
[U.S. corporation] argues that the property has been seized de facto."83
2. UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE
In most cases, the Tribunal consistently stated that unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the "incident of ownership"
constituted a compensable taking.84 The various decisions focused on
the "reality of the impact of the alleged expropriations."85 Before the
Tribunal will find an expropriation, it must find that there was an unrea-
sonable interference with property rights caused by actions attributable
to the foreign government.86 In cases before the Tribunal, unreasonable
interference was deemed to include three areas of property: (i) tangible
property; (ii) bank accounts; and (iii) loss of a business entity.
87
a. Tangible Property
In dealing with tangible property, the physical seizure of property
77. See Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 120.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
80. See Brower, supra note 9, at 643.
81. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was created on January 19, 1981, by the United
States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve expropriation disputes. See id. at
639.
82. See id. (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 643.
84. See Brower, supra note 9, at 643-44.
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by Iran constituted an expropriation.88 In Dames & Moore v. Iran,89 the
claimant was successful by establishing that the rented warehouse used
for business was converted to public use (war refugee emergency hous-
ing) and that the claimant's property was kept by the Iranian Army. The
Tribunal held that "the dislocation of ownership rights was complete and
constituted an unreasonable interference amounting to a taking even in
the absence of a formal decree."9 The important point of this case is
that no formal decree by Iran existed, yet an expropriation had occurred
and compensation was therefore granted to the claimant for its property.
b. Bank Accounts
Unreasonable interference regarding bank accounts occurred when
the claimants were unable to withdraw or obtain their funds held in the
Iranian bank on departure from Iran. Theories of liability utilized by the
claimants included expropriation, breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
and breach of applicable treaties.9 ' The Tribunal relied on the unreason-
able interference with the use or control of the property standard.92 Yet,
the Tribunal also required the claimants to show a "high degree of inter-
ference" by Iran before finding expropriation existed.
In American Bell International, Inc. v. Iran,9 3 the claimant had a
bank account in which funds could only be disbursed upon joint signa-
tures by the claimant's designated agent and a "representative of an Ira-
nian governmental entity with which the claimant had been doing
business prior to the Revolution."94 The claimant could not get the rep-
resentative to execute the necessary documents to close the account and
release the funds. The Iranian representative demanded that the funds be
transferred into an account under the sole control of the Iranian Govern-
ment. The Tribunal found that an expropriation of funds had occurred,
since the claimant did not voluntarily consent to the taking of the funds.
It further found that the "compensable taking or appropriation under any
applicable law-international or domestic-is inevitable, unless there is
clear justification for the seizure.""9 Fortunately for the claimant, the
Iranian Government could not establish any justification for the taking.
The Tribunal made it clear that an expropriation will not occur when a
88. See id. at 645.
89. 4 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 212 (1983).
90. Brower, supra note 9, at 645 (citing Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 122,
223 (1983)).
91. See Brower, supra note 9, at 645.
92. See id. at 646 (citing Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, I IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 499, 504-06 (1981-
82)).
93. See Brower, supra note 9, at 646.
94. Id.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
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bank is nationalized, since it affects only the ownership and not the bank
account liabilities.96 It appears that if the claimant had dominion and
control over the funds, then the transfer would not constitute an
expropriation.
c. Loss of Business Entity
Unreasonable interference in the loss of a business entity or com-
mercial operation in Iran constituted "de facto" expropriation.97 Expro-
priation had occurred when the owner's management or directors had
been replaced by the Iranian Government. Essentially, the standard was
whether the former managers or directors were able to participate in
management.98
The Tribunal has held that an expropriation occurs when the owner
no longer receives financial information and income distributions.9 9 The
Tribunal also found that the scope of the management function is a criti-
cal factor in determining whether an expropriation had occurred. It held
that "when the Government-appointed managers have complete author-
ity to run the business, displacing the former management and preclud-
ing the owner from selecting any representative," then an expropriation
has occurred." Thus, it appears that the Tribunal looked to the actual
impact on the owners to determine expropriation status, and ignored the
outward intent of the government's actions.
The ability to continue management of a corporation even though
the owner's rights to income are cut off, however, will not constitute an
expropriation. In Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Iran,' the Tribunal found
no expropriation even though: (1) expatriate personnel were expelled
from Iran; (2) the claimant did not receive dividends from the corpora-
tion; (3) the company's two representatives were forced to leave the
board of directors; and (4) financial information was not provided to the
claimant. The Tribunal held that the claimant's attempts to participate in
the management of the company by its two minority directors on the
seven-person board of directors nullified its claims of expropriation.
The Tribunal did, however, award "cash dividends that had not been
96. See id. (citing William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran v. Iran, 5 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 198 (1984)).
97. De facto expropriation means a matter of conduct or practice not founded upon law.
98. See Brower, supra note 9, at 648 (citing Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R.
122, 155 (1983)).
99. See id. at 648 (citing Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, 6 IRAN-
U.S.C.T.R. 219, 224-26 (1984)).
100. Id. at 649.
101. Id. at 651.
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paid but declared, up to the jurisdictional cutoff point of January 19,
1981."1o2
3. INTENTIONAL CONDUCT BY THE EXPROPRIATING GOVERNMENT
In addition to establishing an unreasonable interference, the "claim-
ant must establish that such government intentionally took action to
assert control over the property."' 03 Unreasonable interference can
occur, but it is extremely critical that a nexus be established between the
unreasonable interference and the conduct of the government regarding
dominion and control over a claimant's property.
For example, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, ¢ the claimant
operated a container transport service and entered into an agreement
with the Iranian Transportation Company ("ITC"). The ITC failed to
provide pilots, tugboats, and refused to arrange for customs, health, and
immigration clearances. It also dismissed the entire non-Iranian
workforce and prohibited any discipline or discharge of the Iranian
workforce. Sea-Land first suspended its service to ITC, until finally ter-
minating it. The Tribunal was aware that the claimant's ability to oper-
ate its business was severely frustrated; yet, it stated that" [a] finding of
expropriation would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal be satis-
fied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the con-
duct of Sea-Land's operation, the effect of which was to deprive the Sea-
Land of the use and benefit of its investment.""1 5 Though accepting the
claimant's allegations, the Tribunal found that the government did not
intentionally act against the claimant. Essentially expropriation was not
found despite inaction and omissions by the ITC.
In contrast, an expropriation was found in both Computer Sciences
Corp. v. Iran"6 and William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Iran.1°7 In
Computer Sciences Corp., the Iranian Revolutionary Committee
"entered the premises of its business, ordered the departure of all of its
employees, and physically seized its assets stored therein."'0 8 The Tri-
bunal noted that public international law dictated that the Iranian Gov-
ernment "was responsible for the confiscatory actions of the
committee."' 0 9 But the "Tribunal did not discuss the relationship of the
committee to the Government of Iran, [and] ... accepted that [the] rela-
102. Id. at 652.
103. Id.
104. 6 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 149 (1984).
105. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
106. See Brower, supra note 9, at 653.
107. 5 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 198 (1984).
108. Brower, supra note 9, at 653.
109. Id.
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tionship was direct and that the [Iranian Revolutionary Committee] was
a legitimate organ of the Government."" o However, in William L. Per-
eira, where Revolutionary Guards issued a notice of confiscation for the
contents of the claimant's business office, the Tribunal did not presume
a direct relationship. Nevertheless, it held that the notice of confiscation
created a sufficient nexus to find the government responsible.
4. EXPROPRIATION BY A DE JURE OR DE FACTO GOVERNMENT
These cases demonstrate that the Tribunal found expropriation in
either a de jure"' or de facto 1 2 context regarding a government and
nongovernmental entity." 3 In addition to the three-prong test 1 4 and
allegations that the foreign country is liable for the alleged conduct, the
date of expropriation becomes critical, since valuations can fluctuate
during times of social, economic, and political upheaval." 5
5. FIXING THE DATE OF AN EXPROPRIATION FOR VALUATION PURPOSES
If the government issues a formal decree, then the decree date will
be utilized in determining valuation of damages for expropriation pur-
poses. For example, in William L. Pereira, the Revolutionary Guards
issued a notice of confiscation, therefore, the expropriation date was
fixed as of the date of the taking." 6 However, fixing the date for expro-
priation becomes difficult when no formal decree is delivered and the
claimant loses dominion and control over its property over time. In such
a situation, the Tribunal has looked to when the owner's access has been
blocked or when the interference becomes an unreasonable depriva-
tion. 1 7 In any event, the test is ultimately a factual issue, requiring the
Tribunal to interpret the facts as presented.
B. Compensation Standards
Once an expropriation has been established, compensation to the
claimant is the end to a long, unfortunate saga. Compensation involves
two elements: (1) the type of remedy available;" 8 and (2) the scope of
that remedy.119
110. Id.
111. De jure means government action as a matter of law.
112. See supra notes 97-99.
113. See Brower, supra note 9, at 654.
114. See supra Part III.A.
115. See Brower, supra note 9, at 656-58.
116. See William L. Pereira, 5 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. at 226-27.
117. See Brower, supra note 9, at 657.
118. See id. at 658.
119. See id.
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1. REMEDIES
Remedies available to the claimant when property has been expro-
priated include restitution, specific performance, substitution, punitive
damages, or any other remedies which could indemnify the claimant. '
2
1
In cases before the Tribunal, the decisions focused on return of the value
of the property interest lost to the claimant. The remedies of restitution
and specific performance are not realistic, since enforcement mecha-
nisms are not functional.' 2' Requests for punitive damages are virtually
non-existent. 1
2 2
The scope of compensation involves whether the expropriating
government must pay full value or partial value as compensation. In
dealing with this matter, the Tribunal was faced with two issues: (1)
determining which law was appropriate-Iranian law, treaty law, or
international law; and (2) the content of that law. 123 The underlying
principle of all awards was that full compensation must be paid by the
expropriating state. Whether the compensation was determined under
Iranian law, treaty law, or international law, the principle of full com-
pensation was applied.
2. THE METHODOLOGY OF DAMAGE CALCULATIONS
The method of calculating damages is significant in determining
compensation. The Tribunal correctly considered economic conditions
in ascertaining damages. For example, budget analysis and forecasting
requires the analyst to consider future market conditions or trends in
fixing valuations. The analyst is forced, by common business practice,
to realistically assess future performance. This concept, as applied in
the Tribunal cases, required market analysis of future economic trends.
In American International Group, Inc. v. Iran,'24 the Tribunal stated that
political, social, and economic factors had to be considered; thus, it held
that valuation principles dictated that awards be reduced to reflect nega-
tive forecasts of business earnings.125
Calculating damages is industry-specific and the type of expropri-
ated property will determine the amount of the award. For example,
future profits for an expropriated industrial facility'26 and expropriation




123. See Brower, supra note 9, at 659.
124. 4 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 96 (1983).
125. See id.
126. See Brower, supra note 9, at 666-67.
127. See id.
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assessment requires that a greater value be placed on the industrial busi-
ness. However, a service sector entity is subject to unstable local econo-
mies, and is, therefore, viewed to be at much greater risk in a post-
revolutionary environment. 28
Many financial theories abound regarding valuation of existing
businesses. Financial models include the analysis of price/earnings
ratios, discounted cash flow analysis, actual share prices, and other crite-
ria. 12 9 The Tribunal did not reject any of the valuation methods.
Instead, two considerations were of major significance: (1) the theory
presented must be realistic and consider all relevant economic factors
affecting income; and (2) the claimant should also have utilized two or
more models to corroborate the initial valuation determination. 30 The
Tribunal's requirement, that valuations be upheld if corroborating valua-
tion models are used, follows sound appraisal practices.
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES
A. The Tax Consequences of an Expropriation
Once the dust has settled, the effected taxpayer must confront the
tax consequences of an expropriation. A foreign expropriation loss is
defined as being a loss "sustained by reason of the expropriation, inter-
vention, seizure, or similar taking of property by the government of any
foreign country, any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of the foregoing."' 31 Sections 165, 166, 1011 and 1231
of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") are the operative provisions in
analyzing the tax implications of an expropriation.
1. CODE SECTION 165
Code section 165(a) provides for deductibility of losses not com-
pensated for by insurance or otherwise. 32 Under section 165(b), "the
basis for determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be
the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from
the sale or other disposition of property."' 33 If the taxpayer is an indi-
vidual the deduction will be limited to:
(1) losses occurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in any
transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade
128. See id. at 666.
129. See id. at 667; see also Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-U.S.C.T.R. 122, 157 (1983)
(authorizing expert to use discounted cash flow methods).
130. See Brower, supra note 9, at 667.
131. I.R.C. § 1351(b) (1996).
132. See id. § 165(a).
133. Id. § 165(b).
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or business; and (3) ... losses of property not connected with a trade
or business entered into for profit, if the losses arise from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
13 4
In addition, Treasury Regulation section 1.165-1(b) 135 states that a
loss, to be allowable as a deduction, must be evidenced by closed and
completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and actually sus-
tained during the taxable year.' 3 6 In determining when a loss through
confiscation has been sustained for federal income tax purposes, the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") will recognize the first act of confisca-
tion as the identifiable event evidencing a closed and completed transac-
tion. 1 37 Determining when the loss occurred during a taxable year is a
question of fact.'38 Thus, the relevant inquiry does not focus on the
legal consequences of the seizure, but on whether the owner was dispos-
sessed. 139 Moreover, the critical inquiry focuses on the year the tax-
payer loses control and possession of the property.1 40  Finally, the
burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish a deductible loss and the
amount of loss. 41  Accordingly, foreign expropriation losses of trade or
business assets held for investment are deductible, 14 1 while losses of
personal assets are not deductible, 4 3 but subject to the general rule
allowing deductions for losses of personal assets arising from fire,
storm, shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft.' 4 4
The first three parts of section 165(c)(3) are fairly straight forward;
however, much controversy exists over the "other casualty" and "theft"
part of section 165(c)(3), and whether losses sustained from foreign
134. Id. § 165(c).
135. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1992).
136. See Rev. Rul. 62-197, 1962-2 C.B. 66. See also Boehm v. IRS, 326 U.S. 287, 291-92
(1945); United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927).
137. See Rev. Rul. 72-7, 1972-1 C.B. 52. In the Cuban expropriation matters, the taxpayer had
the burden of establishing that the expropriation occurred and the date thereof in order to
substantiate a deduction for the loss. The IRS took the position that an officially published
expropriation decree would be prima facie evidence of the Cuban confiscation. See id. See also
Foreign Expropriation Losses Incurred Prior to U.S. Residency Not Deductible, Rules Tax Court,
93 TAX NOTES INT'L 183-11 (Sept. 22, 1993) (noting that "confiscation of personal, nonbusiness
property does not give rise to theft or casualty losses under section 165(c)(3).").
138. See Robert P. Ruwe, Couple Who Fled Iran to Prove Year in Which Property Loss
Occurred, 92 TAX NoTEs INT'L 45-7 (Oct. 7, 1992); see also Boehm, 326 U.S. at 291-92; Korn v.
IRS, 524 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1975); George P. Kazen, Fifth Circuit Allows Deduction for
Iranian Expropriation, 91 TAX NOTES INT'L 47-26 (Nov. 20, 1991).
139. See Rozenfeld v. IRS, 181 F.2d 388, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1950).
140. See S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. at 401-03; Riba v. IRS, 54 T.C. 1347 (1970).
141. See Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223, 227 (1931).
142. See I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (1966).
143. See Alan Epstein, Note, Foreign Expropriation Losses of Personal Assets: Should a
Deduction Be Allowed Under Internal Revenue Code Section 165(c)(3)?, 40 TAX LAW. 211
(1986).
144. See I.R.C. § 165(a), (c).
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expropriation of personal assets are considered "other casualties." Yet,
"[t]he judiciary's rigid application of the 'other casualty' and 'theft'
prongs of section 165(c)(3) to the foreign expropriation losses of per-
sonal assets [has] result[ed] in nondeductibility."' 45
2. CODE SECTION 166
Section 166(a)(1) of the Code provides a deduction for "any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year."' 14 6 The amount of
the deduction for the bad debt is determined by using the "adjusted basis
provided in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other
disposition of property."' 47 A bona fide debt is defined as a debt "aris-
ing from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforcea-
ble obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."' 48 The
IRS relies on the following principles to determine when such a loss has
been sustained by a U.S. taxpayer: (1) when an act of confiscation has
deprived the taxpayer of ownership and control over the business, with
little chance of being compensated; and (2) when the identifiable event
indicates a closed and completed transaction has occurred. 149 The bur-
den of proof is on the taxpayer to establish the act and date.
Interestingly enough, the Act of State Doctrine has been argued to
bar casualty loss for foreign expropriation. Some commentators claim
that the courts have indiscriminately incorporated the State Doctrine into
the law of federal income taxation, without expressing any substantive
reasoning to support this implication. 5 ' The logical result would be to
analyze foreign expropriation losses on a case-by-case basis with similar
treatment given to other types of losses.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 166(a)(1).
147. Id. § 166(b).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (1992).
149. See Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 52 (discussing the tax treatment of foreign expropriation
losses incurred by domestic corporations, under sections 165, 166, 172 (repealed) and 1231). For
a discussion on the tax treatment of foreign expropriation losses incurred by domestic
corporations, see Rev. Rul. 62-197, 1962-2 C.B. 66 (discussing the deductibility of losses
sustained by reason of confiscation by the Cuban Government of property in Cuba owned by U.S.
citizens or domestic corporations). The ruling further provided:
[It] is the position of the Service that acts of confiscation, whether by way of
seizure, intervention in, expropriation, or similar taking of property, by the Cuban
Government constitutes identifiable events which, in light of all of the
circumstances, have resulted in closed and completed transactions, notwithstanding
promises of indemnification.
Id.
150. See Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 52.
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V. ASSET PROTECTION TECHNIQUES
A. Risk Analysis
The potential for expropriation should always be a major concern
for U.S. investors actively investing abroad, and risk analysis is critical
when assessing that probability. There are three "defensive" positions
legal counsel should implement to avoid expropriation: (1) long-term
planning against expropriation; (2) short-term planning against expropri-
ation; and (3) crisis planning while the expropriation is in progress.' 5 '
Similar to underwriting standards utilized by insurance companies, U.S.
investors should consider these three categories from a risk-analysis
viewpoint. Investment vehicles providing significant returns should be
realistically assessed against the back drop of the risks associated with
investing in a foreign country.
B. Long-Term Planning Against Expropriation
The goal of long-term planning against expropriation is to mini-
mize assets and activities in the foreign country that could be subject to
the foreign country's jurisdiction and control.' 52 Under this principle,
the corporation trades, but does not invest in the foreign country. 153 Fur-
thermore, the corporation could build industrial facilities on a "pay as
you go basis and provide management services or casualty services...
for a fee."' 54 Moreover, the corporation could enter into a joint venture
with the foreign country.
55
The corporation could conduct its business through a U.S. branch
or other foreign corporation. The net effect is to clearly demonstrate that
the "assets of a foreign corporation [in the host foreign country] that
have a situs outside the host [foreign] country are not subject to expro-
priation by the host [foreign] country."' 156 This establishes whether
those assets are owned by a U.S. corporation or another foreign com-
pany. 157 However, international law my prohibit the taking of assets
outside the foreign country that are owned by an alien.'5 8
The corporation could also protect its supply inventory by main-
taining title to the goods in another foreign entity, until the goods arrive
151. See Philip R. Stansbury, Planning Against Expropriation, 24 INT'L LAw. 677, 678, 683,
686 (1990).
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in the host foreign country. 15 9 A corporation that runs a lean business by
maintaining low inventory supplies will further reduce the risk of expro-
priation. 6 ° Additionally diversifying the "core" business into non-sub-
sidiary companies could deprive the foreign country any incentive to
expropriate, since the entities are not subsidiaries of the target
company. 161
C. Short-Term Planning Against Expropriation
The goal of short-term planning against expropriation is to collect
evidence to justify the corporation's case for compensation.1 62 This
phase of the "defensive" process occurs when expropriation is on the
horizon and it is too late to reorganize assets.
63
Proactive measures include assimilating documents concerning the
operation of the corporation in the foreign country from sources
"outside" the expropriating country. Once the expropriation has
occurred, the documents relating to financial statements, balance sheets,
income, cash flow, assets, liabilities, and values belong to the foreign
country. 64 To build the corporation's case for compensation, the attor-
ney should work with the business department of the corporation in
order to establish a "foundation" for compensation.
65
An extremely important item that should be collected outside the
foreign country is the relevant tax documentation, as this is an area in
which foreign government counterclaims often exist, due to large statu-
tory penalties for tax violations. 166 Additionally, the attorney should not
overlook environmental, safety, or toxic tort claims, which could be the
basis of a counterclaim by the foreign government.
67
D. Crisis Planning While the Expropriation Is in Progress
If the expropriation is in progress, avoid overt conduct which could
signal provocation to the foreign government. An appropriate response
to the expropriation should be to brief the State and Treasury Depart-
ment16 8 officials in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. embassy in the for-
159. See id. at 680.
160. See id. at 681.
161. See id. at 682.
162. See id. at 683.
163. See id.
164. Hopefully, the U.S.-based corporation would have a duplicate set of books to avoid this
extra precaution.
165. See id. at 683.
166. See id. at 684.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 686. The U.S. claimant should contact the Treasury Department, since its
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eign country, since their help could avert the expropriation. 169 Plans
should also include protection for the expatriate, including removal from
the host country.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two reasons exist to explain why expropriations occur: renewed
nationalism 170 and retaliation for colonization. 7 ' Nationalism has been
used to validate an expropriation since foreign investments are perceived
as threats to the country's culture and lifestyle. Acts of nationalism pre-
serve the past, present, and future of a country's identity.
With the demise of the Cold War and the establishment of a New
World Order, one must consider the probabilities of an expropriation. I72
We know that investment capital is needed by emerging 7 3 countries,
and this alone should reduce the possibility of an expropriation. 17 If the
New World Order meets the needs of developing countries, how does an
expropriation fit into the equation? It does not-at least not in the short
term.
responsibilities include foreign aid, U.S. government guaranteed financing, and international
financial institutions.
169. See id.
170. "Nationalism" is defined as a concern for or attachment to a particular nation's interests
or culture and an advocacy of national independence.
171. "Colonization" is defined as a group of settlers in a new land who remain subject to the
parent nation. In the context of this Article, colonization refers to expansion by Western cultures
into foreign countries.
172. "New World Order" refers to the decline in Cold War policies (except for the United
States vis-a-vis Cuba and several foreign countries), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and global
goals of peace and cooperation.
173. Emerging countries are countries that have moved to a democratic form of government
and away from communism, socialism, and dictatorships, with the immediate need of investment
capital to re-tool industry.
174. Reference is to the governments of Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Cuba.
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